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Essay

The Rule of Law and the Law of
Precedents
Daniel A. Farber†
“History counts. The only significant question is how.” 1
The relationship between precedent and the rule of law is
hotly contested.2 On the one hand, consider the views of the
late Justice Lewis Powell. According to Justice Powell,
“[E]limination of constitutional stare decisis would represent
an explicit endorsement of the idea that the Constitution is
nothing more than what five Justices say it is. This would undermine the rule of law.”3 He added that the “inevitability of
change touches law as it does every aspect of life. But stability
and moderation are uniquely important to the law.”4 Powell
concluded that “restraint in decisionmaking and respect for decisions once made are the keys to preservation of an independent judiciary and public respect for the judiciary’s role as a
guardian of rights.”5
On the other hand, stare decisis has also been portrayed as
a betrayal of the judge’s duty to follow the law and thus of the
rule of law itself. Here, consider the view of a current Justice,
† Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
1. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 745 (1988).
2. For useful overviews, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 570 (2001); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367
(1988); Monaghan, supra note 1; Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 571 (1987). For insights into how precedent functions in other legal systems, see D. NEIL MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING
PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1997).
3. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 281, 288 (1990).
4. Id. at 289.
5. Id. at 289–90.
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Antonin Scalia. Rather than embracing precedent as critical to
the rule of law, he views it as an obstacle to correct constitutional interpretation:
In any case, I would think it a violation of my oath to adhere to what I
consider a plainly unjustified intrusion upon the democratic process
in order that the Court might save face. With some reservation concerning decisions that have become so embedded in our system of
government that return is no longer possible . . . , I agree with Justice
Douglas: “A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to revere past history and accept what was once written. But
he remembers above all else that it is the Constitution which he
swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors
may have put on it.” Or as the Court itself has said: “[W]hen convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow
precedent. In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon
amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its
history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its
constitutional decisions.”6

In Scalia’s view, when the Court is faced with an erroneous
prior decision, “[w]e provide far greater reassurance of the rule
of law by eliminating than by retaining such a decision.”7
Although most originalists continue to give some weight to
precedent, the tension between modern judicial doctrine and
the original understanding may be profound. As Henry Monaghan explains, “[N]o satisfying conception of originalism seems
capable of accounting for Brown.”8 He adds that “the abortion
cases, the reapportionment cases, and the sex discrimination
cases are also inconsistent with any constrained conception of
the original understanding.”9 Overall, he says:
[N]o acceptable version of original understanding theory can yield a
convincing descriptive account of the major features of our ‘Bicentennial Constitution’: nontextual guarantees of civil liberties; a powerful,
presidentially centered national government; a huge administrative
apparatus; and national responsibility for what had long been conceived of either as local responsibilities or as not the responsibility of
government at all.10

Monaghan sees in this conflict a serious problem that original6. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735,
736 (1949) and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)), overruled by
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
7. Id.
8. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 728 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954)).
9. Id. at 723. Monaghan also argues that the modern presidency is incompatible with the original understanding. See id. at 735–39.
10. Id. at 739.
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ists must confront and solve: though “most, if not all” of these
Supreme Court decisions are “highly suspect” on originalist
grounds, it seems “almost unquestionable that these decisions
are now beyond judicial recall.”11 Some originalists may disagree with the particulars or see more room for precedent to fill
gaps in the original understanding, but the potential impact of
rejecting precedent in favor of originalism is obviously great.12
This Essay explores this contested ground. I will begin
with the familiar pragmatic case for stare decisis, particularly
as the arguments apply to bedrock precedents. Originalists often concede the undesirability of overruling bedrock precedents. Yet, they fail to realize the implications of this concession when combined with the drive of the legal system toward
consistency and coherence. I will then show how originalism itself needs to rely on a system of precedent in order to achieve
the rule of law. As it turns out, originalists would have need for
stare decisis even if originalism had been the entrenched
method of interpretation from the beginning.
With that background in mind, I will turn to the issue of
stare decisis and abortion, which has been the focal point of recent disputes over stare decisis. Although the Court has erred
in viewing its earlier abortion precedents as having heightened
immunity from overruling, it did give earlier precedent an appropriate place in formulating a standard governing the constitutionality of abortion restrictions. This brings me to the question of how to read precedents: as sources of rules or as sources
of general principles and analogies? The choice is a pragmatic
one, but contrary to the view of Justice Scalia and others, the
presumption should be against viewing precedents as rules.
Stare decisis seeks to preserve stability, but the doctrine
must also leave room for innovation and correction of error.

11. Id. at 740.
12. Like many who seek radical social change, beginning with Martin Luther, those who attack basic precedents claim only to be restoring a “true” but
forgotten social order. For instance, in critiquing a Burkean defense of stare
decisis, Steven Calabresi says: “The sweeping away of wayward practices and
the restoration of fundamental constitutional traditions is a form of conservative revolutionary change, not French revolutionary change.” Steven G.
Calabresi, Overrule Casey!: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments
Against Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 22 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming Apr. 2006) (manuscript at 33, on file with author). Whether revolutionaries are inspired by memories of a glorious past or visions of an entrancing future, however, revolutions are likely to be just as dislocating and risky to
bystanders.
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Striking the right balance is not easy. In the end, I opt for a
version of stare decisis in which rulings are not overturned except for strong reasons, and only for compelling reasons in the
case of what I call “bedrock” precedents.13 But this version of
stare decisis is not rigid, because it sees doctrine as evolving
over multiple decisions rather than “written in stone” in individual decisions. That is to say, my view of precedent disfavors
overruling, especially of lines of precedent rather than individual cases,14 but leaves more room than Scalia’s does for goodfaith reinterpretation.
I. THE PRAGMATIC CASE FOR STARE DECISIS
Stare decisis is not rocket science.15 Many of the reasons
for giving weight to precedents are easily grasped, particularly
for those bedrock precedents that provide the clearest examples
of the need for stare decisis. Nevertheless, even if they seem
somewhat familiar, those reasons are worth reviewing given
recent criticisms of stare decisis.
A. BENEFITS OF STARE DECISIS
Few lawyers deny that precedent plays some legitimate
role in Supreme Court decisions.16 Nevertheless, it is instruc-

13. The “compelling reasons” exception certainly covers the Court’s rejection of the prior doctrine of “separate but equal” in Brown, 347 U.S. at 483. If
nothing else, history had shown the old doctrine to be a chimera: there was
plenty of “separate” but nothing “equal” in Jim Crow!
14. It is only fair to ask whether the category of bedrock doctrines coincides with my substantive preferences. The answer is, at least, not entirely. In
my view, this approach to stare decisis would probably insulate a number of
doctrines that I consider incorrectly decided as an original matter, such as the
application of the Eleventh Amendment to federal question cases, the constitutionalizing of executive privilege, the regulatory takings doctrine, and the
requirement of “injury in fact” as a basis for standing.
15. On the contrary, it takes much more intellectual ability to mount an
attack on something that is so obviously in accord with common sense.
16. For an early counterexample, arguing that stare decisis is contrary to
progressive thinking, see Boyd Winchester, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 8
GREEN BAG 257 (1896). An even earlier example is Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Even earlier, Jonathan Swift mocked stare decisis, describing it as
an effort to preserve “‘all the decisions formerly made against common justice
and the general reason of mankind.’” See Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the
Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 67, 67 (1988) (quoting JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS
275 (Novel Library ed. 1947) (1726)).
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tive to consider the reasons why precedent is so important, how
precedent is used, and what the use of precedent tells us about
the nature of constitutional law.
Although precedents seem to have special force for the judiciary, consideration of past decisions is important in other
settings. We can divide the reasons for respecting precedent
into three groups: (a) those that apply to every decision maker,
judicial or otherwise; (b) those that particularly apply to courts;
and (c) those that are especially linked with the nature of constitutional law.17
There are obvious reasons why any decision maker should
consider the views of her predecessors. These reasons apply as
much to a low-level officer such as a school principal as to a
Justice or a President.18 One of these universal justifications is
efficiency: it saves time and trouble to rely on earlier decisions.19 To reconsider all of our commitments and practices on a
daily basis would ensure paralysis.
It is simply unworkable to leave everything up for grabs all
of the time.20 Imagine if, in every First Amendment case, the
lawyers had to reargue basic questions such as whether the
First Amendment applies to the states or whether it covers
nonpolitical speech (both of which have been debated by scholars). Every brief would have to be a treatise, arguing every
point of First Amendment doctrine from scratch. Moreover, different judges could adopt completely different First Amendment theories, so a lawyer in a case before the Supreme Court
might have to write nine different briefs based on inconsistent
theories of the Constitution. Similarly, dialogue between the
Justices themselves would be stymied because they would be
operating within different conceptual frameworks. Unless most
issues can be regarded as settled most of the time, coherent
discussion is simply impossible. Surely “it would overtax the

17. A good summary of the standard arguments for respecting precedent
can be found in Maltz, supra note 2, at 368–72.
18. This aspect of stare decisis is explored in Schauer, supra note 2, at
572. As he says, “In countless instances, out of law as well as in, the fact that
something was done before provides, by itself, a reason for doing it that way
again.” Id.
19. This efficiency justification is explained in Jonathan R. Macey, The
Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 93, 102 (1989).
20. On the agenda-control function of stare decisis, see Fallon, supra note
2, at 573; Monaghan, supra note 1, at 744–46.
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Court and the country alike to insist . . . that everything always
must be up for grabs at once.”21
A second reason is humility. It would be arrogant to assume that we alone have access to wisdom. The views of earlier
decision makers are entitled to a respectful hearing for that
reason alone. Some of those judges are entitled to particular respect—John Marshall, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Louis
Brandeis come immediately to mind as great figures in the history of the Supreme Court.22 The argument based on humility
does not support adherence to precedents that are now known
to be clearly wrong, but it does support some degree of deference when we are unsure of the merits of an issue.23 As even
one of the sharpest critics of stare decisis concedes, some degree
of respect for prior decisions is warranted even if precedent is
not considered binding:
Abrogating stare decisis . . . is not inconsistent with according appropriate respect to precedent. “Respect” implies an obligation of due consideration, careful reflection, and deference to the fact that other intelligent and reflective judges have thought about an issue before and
taken care to express their reasoning in writing. . . . According precedent proper respect could entail simply giving the decisions of prior
courts respectful consideration and deference—perhaps even the
benefit of the doubt in cases of uncertainty.24

It is true that this kind of “respect” is less than what strong
versions of stare decisis might call for, but respect can easily
shade into a habit of deference, and deference can solidify into
obedience.
Another set of reasons applies, to some extent, to the school
principal, but much more to the judge. One is the moral desir21. Fallon, supra note 2, at 584; see also id. at 593 (“And so the process
would continue, literally without surcease, for no question ever could be
deemed to have been settled definitively.”).
22. Cf. Macey, supra note 19, at 111 (“Well known jurists such as Henry J.
Friendly, John Harlan, and Richard Posner are distinguished for their love of
the law as well as for their reasoning ability. Their name on an opinion has a
signaling effect that magnifies its value.”).
23. Moreover, earlier judges operated in a different context, so their decisions provide a check on what might be the influence of biases and wishful
thinking on our own decisions. Furthermore, older decisions have stood the
test of time—we generally know that they have not caused big problems,
whereas a change in rules might have unforeseen consequences. For example,
the shift from coinage to paper money does not seem to have caused economic
problems, but it is less clear what a reversal might do.
24. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May
Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J.
1535, 1545–46 (2000).
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ability of equal treatment. It seems arbitrary for a case to be
decided one way this year, perhaps leading to a prisoner’s execution or other serious consequences, and for an identical case
to be decided the opposite way next year simply because of a
change in judicial personnel.25 This call for uniformity is not an
unshakeable imperative, but it does caution against departing
from precedent too quickly. Given the critical issues that often
come before the courts, consistency seems especially important.
A related reason for adhering to precedent is that only by
following the reasoning of previous decisions can the courts
provide guidance for the future, rather than a series of unconnected outcomes in particular cases. If all we know is that a
court affirmed some convictions and reversed others, we can
have very little confidence in guessing what rule applies in the
future.26 By articulating standards that are binding for the future, courts can offer some semblance of what has been called
the “law of rules,”27 which is one aspect of the rule of law.28
Also relating specifically to the judiciary is the discipline
imposed on decision making by the knowledge that a decision
will function as a precedent.29 In deciding a particular case, a
judge must provide reasons that will have precedential effect
on later cases (both in the same court and in lower courts).
Thus, the judge is pushed to a form of neutrality—not the neutrality of being value-free, but the neutrality of articulating
standards that one is willing to live with in the future. “If the
future must treat what we do now as presumptively binding,
then our current decision must judge not only what is best for
now, but also how the current decision will affect the decision of

25. For a discussion of the “argument from fairness,” see Schauer, supra
note 2, at 595–97.
26. For a discussion of the predictability argument, see id. at 597–98.
27. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
28. See Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,
494 (1987) (“[S]tare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law.”).
29. This may even be true if the decision is unsupported by explanation:
[A]wareness of the future effect of today’s decision pervades legal and
nonlegal argument. Lawyers and others routinely deploy a battery of
metaphors—the slippery slope, the parade of horribles, the floodgates,
the foot in the door, and the entering wedge are but a few—to urge
decisionmakers to consider the future effect of today’s decisions. Undergirding each of these metaphors is the belief that even an uncharacterized precedent can influence the future.
Schauer, supra note 2, at 574.
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other . . . cases.”30 It is in this sense that “neutral principles”
are important to judicial opinions. Thus, respect for precedent
pushes judges to seek generality and coherence in their decisions.
B. BEDROCK PRECEDENTS
At least in certain kinds of cases, precedent gains added
importance in the constitutional area. One purpose of having a
written constitution is to create a stable framework for government.31 This goal would be undermined if the Court failed to
give special credence to bedrock precedents—precedents that
have become the foundation for large areas of important doctrine. Some obvious examples involve the rulings of the New
Deal era upholding the validity of the Social Security system
and other federal taxing and spending programs, and those
recognizing federal jurisdiction over the economy. These omelettes cannot be unscrambled today, as even some devoted believers in originalism acknowledge.32 Likewise, it is far too late
in the day to invalidate independent agencies, as some originalists would like,33 or to undo the twentieth century rulings that
“incorporated” the Bill of Rights and made it applicable to the
states, or to reconsider the constitutionality of segregation.
It is not simply that it would be imprudent to overrule
these doctrines, though obviously it would be. But in an important sense, it would run against the purposes of constitutional30. Id. at 589.
31. Schauer suggests that stability is a particularly important value for
law:
Perhaps we should view legal institutions, including lawyers and law
schools, as part of a larger mechanism—call it society—that needs
some institutions that are creative, speculative, adaptive, and risktaking, and other institutions that are cautious, predictable, and risk
averse. These latter institutions might act as stabilizers and brakes,
rather than as engines and accelerators, and it may be that both
forms of institution together constitute, or at least approach, the ideal
mix of decisionmaking structures. Within this mix of structures it
should be apparent that precedent, as an inherently constraining
form of argument, is more suited to some forms of decision than to
others.
Id. at 604–05.
32. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 158 (1990); Monaghan, supra note 1, at 723–24.
33. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (“The post–New Deal administrative state is
unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to nothing
less than a bloodless constitutional revolution.”).
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ism. Overruling these doctrines would create just the kind of
uncertainty and instability that constitutions (even more than
other laws) are designed to avoid:
Stability and continuity of political institutions (and of shared values)
are important goals of the process of constitutional adjudication, particularly “in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”
Moreover, these values are in part at least among the values that the
new constitutional order was specifically designed to secure, as the
Preamble to the Constitution itself makes plain. Indeed, the Federalist No. 49 even decried appeals to the people in order to “maintain[ ]
the constitutional equilibrum of government.”34

Legitimate or not, these modern constitutional doctrines
are here to stay as a realistic matter. Plenary federal power
over fiscal and economic matters, independent agencies, and
application of the Bill of Rights to the states are now integral
parts of our system of government; in some ways, they are more
“constitutional” than some of the more obscure parts of the
written Constitution. Consider the following question: Which
would be more shocking, a Supreme Court decision invalidating
the Social Security system, or one upholding a requirement to
rent vacant rooms to soldiers in peacetime? Yet the Third
Amendment speaks plainly to the latter situation, in a way
that cannot be said of Social Security.
Along these lines, one of the most vehement critics of stare
decisis in the Reagan era allowed for an exception when overruling a precedent would cause a national crisis. “Surely,” he
said, “a judge need not vote to overrule an erroneous precedent
if to do so would pitch the country into the abyss—if . . . it
would be on the order of killing the body to save a limb.”35 He
pointed to the Legal Tender Cases,36 which upheld the constitutionality of paper money,37 as an apt example.38 And admittedly, whatever the Framers might have thought about the
matter, it is hard to see how a modern economy could survive if
34. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 748–49 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) and THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 341 (James
Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
35. Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 410 (1988). Cooper was the Assistant Attorney General heading the Office of Legal Counsel at the time. Id.
at 401. Interestingly, the article does not contain the customary disclaimer of
nonofficial status: “The views expressed here are solely those of the author.”
36. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
37. Id. at 540–44.
38. Cooper, supra note 35, at 410.
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only metal coins could be used as a medium of exchange.
The example of paper money also suggests another reason
for respecting bedrock precedents. Imagine that the Supreme
Court did overrule itself and held that only coins could be constitutionally used as a medium of exchange. One possible result
would be an immediate economic crisis, especially given the
widespread use of American currency abroad. But perhaps such
a crisis would not occur if the political system responded
quickly enough. Maybe Congress and the states could drop all
other business to pass an immediate constitutional amendment. Or some ingenious solution could be adopted to support a
modern economy while restricting “money” to metal coinage,
such as creating a computerized barter system that would
minimize the need to use money at all. Still, even assuming a
happy ending, the issue would necessarily consume the public
agenda until Congress implemented the solution. Thus, the
Court would have preempted legislative attention from other,
more urgent social problems. Should curing a possible error in
an 1870 case really push off the legislative agenda such current
issues as the Iraq War, rebuilding the Gulf after Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, or the threat of terrorism? Preempting the
normal process of government for such a purpose seems misguided, to say the least.
Virtually everyone, including nearly all originalists, acknowledge that certain precedents cannot be undone. Robert
Bork, for instance, concedes that some judicial practices are “so
accepted by the society, so fundamental to the private and public expectations of individuals and institutions” as to be immune from judicial revision.39 But the significance of this point
should not be underestimated. Unlike the doctrine of adverse
possession in property law, which is peripheral to the system of
property ownership, stare decisis in constitutional law changes
the nature of the enterprise.40 Bedrock precedents cannot be
quarantined; instead, they inevitably affect the system of constitutional law as a whole.
39. BORK, supra note 32, at 158.
40. For analogies between adverse possession and stare decisis, see Tyler
Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gary
Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 23, 33 (1994) (“If judges are going to continue to employ precedent, there
is value in acknowledging that the practice is nothing more than ‘a sort of intellectual adverse possession’—and that the territory adversely possessed is
nothing less than the Constitution.”).
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The originalist impulse regarding these bedrock but allegedly “wrong” precedents is to say “this far, but not an inch farther.” Under this view, the court should not overrule key precedents, but it should always return to first principles in
considering new issues. But this is an untenable stance in a legal system that seeks some form of coherence. What sense does
it make to say that Congress may give legal sanction to paper
money but not to electronic transfers? What sense would it
make to say that Social Security is constitutional, but that expanding the program to cover expenses for prescription drugs
or transforming it into a program of private accounts would not
be? Or to try to limit the racial equality principle of Brown v.
Board of Education to the Jim Crow laws of the 1950s?
A sensible legal system can tolerate having a few small
patches of doctrine retained because of practical imperatives
but rejected in principle.41 But a legal system in which huge
swathes of the law are considered unprincipled, while small
corners are governed by principle, makes no sense at all. Bedrock rulings cannot be “limited to their facts” if the legal system
is to have any claim to integrity; rather, they must be given
generative force as precedents.42
Adherence to precedent does not mean simply refusing to
overrule past decisions—it means taking them seriously as
starting points for analysis in future cases. This notion derives
partly from reasoning by analogy based on similarities between
the facts of cases, but more importantly, it reflects a need to
give credence to the reasoning in earlier opinions. The willingness of judges to defer in this way to their predecessors—and
their expectation of similar deference from their successors—
transforms the Court from an ever-changing collection of individual judges to an institution capable of building a continuing
body of law rather than merely a succession of one-time rulings. This kind of decision making, which is familiar to students of the common law system,43 is structured enough to pro41. For example, Monaghan suggests that Roe might fall into this category. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 759.
42. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of
Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming Apr. 2006) (manuscript at 4, on
file with author) (arguing that precedent necessarily takes on a life of its own,
corrupting the purity of interpretative theories).
43. As one legal philosopher has put it,
Given all the strange twists and turns of common law reasoning, one
might be tempted to conclude that this seems an utterly bizarre way
to run a legal system, were it not for the fact that common law rea-
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vide stability and coherence, but flexible enough to allow improvisation and growth.44
Like the common law, constitutional law is able to grow
and change because of its reliance on precedent, and as with
the common law, these changes generally occur incrementally.
We should resist, however, a simple equation between the
common law and constitutional law. Constitutional law does
not rely purely on judicial precedents in the same way as the
common law.45 In particular, as we will see in the next section,
other forms of constitutional history also play an important
role.
C. NONJUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
Nonjudicial precedents can also play a significant role in
constitutional law. Perhaps the best illustration involves the
scope of executive power. As this example shows, respect for
precedent need not be based on judge-worship. A consistent line
of interpretation by Congress and the President is also deserving of respect.46
The extent of executive power is hotly disputed,47 so what
is presented here will be a set of conclusions rather than a fullfledged argument on the subject. On a fair reading, the historical record fails to settle what the Framers meant by the “executive power” or how that phrase related to specific grants of
soning seems to reflect at a more public level the way people develop
their own moral principles and views on life.
BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 149 (3d ed. 2004).
44. The analogy between common law and constitutional law has been
most fully explored by David Strauss. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common
Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003).
45. Documents such as the Federalist papers seem to be given something
of the same weight as judicial precedents. Moreover, the text is not a negligible factor, though it does not always seem to trust the weight of subsequent
practice. For an example of the latter, consider the constitutional requirement
that the Senate give “Advice and Consent” to treaties. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2
(emphasis added). When was the last time a President ever asked for the Senate’s prior advice about a possible treaty?
46. Randy Barnett’s Response seems to indicate a degree of agreement
with this view. See Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Superprecedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232 (2006).
47. The reader who cannot resist the temptation to delve further would do
well to consult Steven Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995); A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial
Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1346 (1994); Lawson, supra
note 33; Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993).
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presidential power. As Justice Robert Jackson said in a famous
opinion on presidential power, “Just what our forefathers did
envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern
conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic
as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.”48 He added that a “century and a half ”—today, two centuries—“of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no
net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from
respected sources on each side of any question.”49 It is an exaggeration to say that the historical record teaches us nothing,
but it clearly fails to provide any precise guidance about the
boundaries of presidential power.50
As Madison recognized at the time, there is no way of deducing the precise limits of executive power from general principles. In Federalist No. 37, he said, “Experience has instructed
us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able
to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three
great provinces—the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or
even the privileges and powers of the different legislative

48. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 634–35. The history, of course, is controversial, and the debate
is far too complex to enter into here. My own views are close to those expressed in Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J.
1725 (1996) (arguing that history does not support many of today’s formalist
assumptions in this area). Even those who believe that history and text theoretically provide a definitive answer about presidential power must concede
that in practice they have failed to do so.
50. This is not to say that presidential power was a complete constitutional cipher. The specific grants of power to the President, as well as related
grants of power to Congress in military and foreign affairs, give some guidance. The Framers built on a history of disputes about executive power. We
know that they considered the postrevolutionary governors too weak. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 140–45 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(discussing the problems with the Articles of Confederation). We also know
that they considered the prerevolutionary governors and the English monarch
too strong. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 396–402 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (comparing the President with the King of England). Like Goldilocks, they wanted something that was “not too strong” and
“not too weak” but “just right.” They wanted as much executive energy and
initiative as possible without upsetting the proper balance of republican government. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 435–36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1987) (arguing that the President has as much energy “as Republican principles will admit” without compromising his accountability). But
these principles were too general to resolve hard cases. Thus, when particular
questions about executive power arise, text and original understanding can
provide only limited guidance.
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branches.”51 He sagely added that “[a]ll new laws, though
penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or
less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated
and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”52
The difficulty, then, lies in finding the right balance between energy and efficiency, on the one hand, and legal restraint on the other. The President must be free to respond to
emergencies, but not too free, lest the category of emergency action swallow up too much of public policy and individual liberty. Deductive logic cannot set this balance. Somehow, we
have managed over the course of our history to find an acceptable balance, and the best the Court can do is to try to maintain that balance. It is for this reason that the Steel Seizure
case, the leading authority on presidential power, puts so much
stress on the practical accommodations reached between Congress and the President over the years.53
Nonjudicial precedents, like settled practice by the other
branches, are important for the present discussion because
they illustrate the pull of precedent even outside of the courts.
Consideration of nonjudicial precedents also reinforces the significance of bedrock precedents. The post–New Deal understanding of federal power received the support of the President
and Congress over a long period of time. So has the racial integration mandate of Brown, which was stirringly endorsed by
Congress and the President in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.54
These actions by the “democratic branches” rebuff any argument that these precedents represent a judicial power grab,
and such actions thereby help place the precedents’ legitimacy
beyond question.
II. ORIGINALISM AND STARE DECISIS
Reliance on precedent seems to be here to stay, as even its
fiercest critics regretfully concede. But this does not answer the
51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 244 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
52. Id. at 245.
53. See Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952), which provided the analytic framework
for Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
54. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
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question of whether we should view stare decisis as strengthening or weakening the rule of law. Federalist No. 78 says that
“[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents . . . .”55 Yet stare decisis has also been attacked for being
a source of undue discretion. As one critic put it, stare decisis
“is inherently subjective, and few judges, including Supreme
Court Justices, can resist the natural temptation to manipulate
it.”56
For originalists, stare decisis seems in tension with the
paramount status of the written Constitution. As one critic
says, “If the Constitution says X and a prior judicial decision
says Y, a court has not merely the power, but the obligation, to
prefer the Constitution.”57 Or as another critic has said, “[N]o
court should ever deliberately adhere to what it is fully persuaded are the erroneous constitutional decisions of the past.
To do so is to act in deliberate violation of the Constitution.”58
It is easy to understand the dissatisfaction of originalists with
stare decisis. By allowing the views of five Justices to displace
the “true” meaning of the Constitution, stare decisis seems to
authorize a covert form of constitutional amendment. At the
same time, it elevates the mistaken views of five individuals
above the true meaning of the law, thereby in a sense replacing
the rule of law with the “rule of men.” Or so it appears to some
originalists.
Rejection of stare decisis, while appealing to originalists,
poses a practical problem for them, most clearly in the instance
of the bedrock precedents discussed earlier. It also presents a
bit of a political problem to the extent they are forced to treat
just rulings such as Brown like unwelcome house guests, who
should never have been allowed admission but can no longer be
55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
56. Cooper, supra note 35, at 404.
57. Lawson, supra note 40, at 27–28. As Lawson puts it,
If a statue, enacted with all of the majestic formalities for lawmaking
prescribed by the Constitution, and stamped with the imprimatur of
representative democracy, cannot legitimately be given effect in an
adjudication when it conflicts with the Constitution, how can a mere
judicial decision possibly have a greater legal status?
Id. at 27. Thus, he says, “What’s sauce for the legislative or executive goose is
also sauce for the judicial gander.” Id. at 28.
58. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of
Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third
Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 681 (1995).
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evicted. On a deeper level, rejection of stare decisis presents a
theoretical conundrum for originalism. Although the two are
not necessarily linked, originalism in practice is linked with a
type of formalism that celebrates the value of clear rules. Justice Scalia, the leading proponent of originalism, provides the
best illustration of the claim that originalism depoliticizes constitutional law by providing a more rule-like framework.
Even a cursory acquaintance with Justice Scalia’s opinions
reveals his passion for order and logic.59 As one leading constitutional scholar has said, “for Justice Scalia, the rule’s the
thing; originalism and traditionalism are means, not ends.”60
She goes on to observe what she calls “the codifier at work”:
[F]irst, state the general rule; second, rationalize the existing messy
pattern of cases by grandfathering in a few exceptions and doing the
best you can to cabin their reach; and third, anticipate future cases in
which the rule might be thought problematic and dispose of them in
advance by writing sub-paragraphs and sub-sub-paragraphs qualifying the rule with clauses beginning with ‘unless’ or ‘except.’61

This passion for rules is tied to Scalia’s desire for consistency,
which he views as the first of all legal virtues, the “very foundation of the rule of law.”62
Because of his desire for clarity, certainty, and consistency,
Justice Scalia has mixed feelings about the common law. He is
uneasy about the common law process, in which law grows,
“not through the pronouncement of general principles, but case59. For an overview of Scalia’s jurisprudential thinking, combined with
some speculation about its biographical origins, see George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990). For recent
critiques of Scalia’s jurisprudence, see Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1583 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529 (1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)).
60. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 78 (1992).
61. Id. at 87.
62. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 588 (1989–90). Consistency is even more important
in the work of judges than it is for legislators and administrators:
Besides its centrality to the rule of law in general, consistency has a
special role to play in judge-made law . . . . The only checks on the arbitrariness of federal judges are the insistence upon consistency and
the application of the teachings of the mother of consistency, logic. . . .
[C]ourts apply to each case a system of abstract and entirely fictional
categories developed in earlier cases, which are designed, if logically
applied, to produce “fair” or textually faithful results.
Id. at 588–89.
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by-case, deliberately, incrementally, one-step-at-a-time.”63 But
the common law process is inherently inconsistent with the
ideal judicial role, according to Scalia: only by announcing and
following clear rules can judicial decisions merit respect, and
only so can they provide certainty, limit future judicial discretion, and provide uniformity.64 Indeed, he maintains, judges
who do not provide abstract rules but instead rely on the totality of the circumstances, are “not so much pronouncing the law
in the normal sense as engaging in the less exalted function of
fact-finding.”65
No wonder another leading advocate of the “law of rules”
was moved to ask whether the common law qualifies as law at
all.66 Indeed, Scalia himself seems to view the common law
with some suspicion, and he regrets that it receives so much attention in law schools. Because law school begins by studying
the common law, he says, the students’ “image of the great
judge—the Holmes, the Cardozo” is one “who has the intelligence to discern the best rule of law for the case at hand and
then the skill to perform the broken-field running through earlier cases that leaves him free to impose that rule.”67 The judge
manages this task by “distinguishing one prior case on the left,
straight-arming another one on the right, high-stepping away
from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until
(bravo!) he reaches the goal—good law.”68
Thus, in an ideal world, where the Court was not already
hemmed in by precedents, the right approach would apparently
be to base every decision solely on the original meaning of the
Constitution. It is easy to see, however, that this would result
in the loss of such virtues as stability, consistency, and clarity—the very virtues that the law of rules is supposed to promote. On the contrary, to achieve the Scalian vision of the rule
of law, originalists also need stare decisis to protect the decisions of today’s originalists against their successors.
63. Scalia, supra note 27, at 1177.
64. See id. at 1178–79.
65. Id. at 1180–81. On Scalia’s views regarding the importance of rules,
see id. at 1176, 1178, 1181. I return to Scalia’s views about the power of individual rulings to “legislate” rules of law later in this Essay. See infra notes
119–23 and accompanying text.
66. Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455
(1989) (reviewing MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW
(1988)).
67. SCALIA, supra note 59, at 9.
68. Id.
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There is no reason to expect originalism, unaided by stare
decisis, to lead to a stable, definitive set of answers to constitutional questions. To begin with, views of history, even by professional historians, are subject to revision over time.69 Shifts
in constitutional interpretation would reflect these historiographical views. To take the example discussed earlier,
views of the executive power in the framing period may change
among historians; so unvarnished originalism would result in
the waxing and waning of presidential authority along with the
latest trends in history departments.
Even among like-minded judges, difficult cases will inevitably arise, where the original meaning of the constitutional
provision is debatable in its application. These cases may turn
on the basis of a single judicial vote, and will therefore be subject to revision whenever a Justice approaches the issue anew.
Judges are not clones, and originalist judges with different political inclinations will, despite their best efforts at objectivity,
be influenced on occasion by their preconceptions. This would
remain true even if all of the judges were “conservatives” because some might be social conservatives, while others might
be libertarians. Such individuals could subscribe to strikingly
different interpretations of original meaning. Indeed, one recent defense of textualism (as opposed to precedent) comes perilously close to admitting that the constitutional text has often
functioned historically merely to provide an excuse for politically motivated decisions by the Court.70
Even assuming the absence of any ideological divisions
whatsoever, judges could still have methodological divisions.
For example, some judges might find the Federalist papers a
more persuasive source of evidence than other documents, or at
an even finer level of detail, some might view Madison as more
reliable than Hamilton, or vice versa. When these methodological differences became outcome determinative, the Court’s rulings would be no more predictable or consistent than they are
today when precedent is ignored. Jurists might also differ in
69. For a discussion of this problem, see Emil A. Kleinhaus, History as
Precedent: The Post-Originalist Problem in Constitutional Law, 110 YALE L.J.
121, 125–28 (2000).
70. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution:
Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 686 (2006) (“In launching
these new doctrines, the Court sometimes lies about its precedents . . . . As I
argued above, the Court has also often used the rhetoric of textualism or
originalism in major cases to displace what it thought were wayward practices
or precedents.”).
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terms of the level of generality with which they defined the
original understanding. Again, inconsistent outcomes would result, depending on the identity of the judges and how their
methodological positions aligned with substantive outcomes in
specific cases. Even in the most pristinely originalist judiciary,
conflicts would still exist between different schools of originalism. Without stare decisis, these methodological disputes would
never be settled definitively.
Some textualists view elaborate recourse to history as unnecessary because they view the text itself as clear.71 They
seem unfazed by the fact that people have been arguing for
decades (and in some cases for centuries) about the meaning of
phrases such as “the executive power,” “due process of law,”
and “equal protection.”72 Perhaps each textualist simply assumes that judges will inevitably adopt his or her own preferred reading of these phrases. What textualism promises is
not consensus but a cacophony of confident proclamations
about the plain meaning of the document. Expecting these disputes to be miraculously settled, when they have existed for
such long periods, is simply unrealistic.
Legal clarity would also suffer from unalloyed originalism.
True, individual opinions might lay down clear rules of law
based on interpretations of original meaning. But different
judges on the same court could well articulate different “clear
rules,” and today’s clear rules might not be those followed in
tomorrow’s opinions. In practice, if the law at any one time consists of overlapping versions of different Justices’ clear rules, or
if the rules mutate over time, this “rule-based” approach might
be incapable of creating clear law.
The rule-of-law deficiencies of originalism are clearest
when originalists disclaim any belief in precedent. But the
problem also arises in more nuanced versions, as exemplified
by a recent argument that precedent can continue to play a vital role for originalists.73 On this view, clear constitutional
71. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 59, at 38.
72. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 389–96 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1987) (debating the scope of executive power as allocated under
the Constitution); Strauss, supra note 44, at 1718 (posing the problem of why
original understanding matters to the interpretation of constitutional provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause).
73. See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning:
Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming Apr. 2006)
(manuscript at 13), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_
files/BarnettR050205.pdf.

FARBER_3FMT

1192

05/17/2006 09:11:10 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1173

meaning remains controlling and precedent is, to that extent,
irrelevant. But when original constitutional meaning is vague,
precedent may govern application to specific cases so long as
those precedents are not inconsistent with original meaning.
Moreover, practice can settle the meaning of ambiguous provisions, and sufficiently strong reliance interests can block recourse to original meaning.
This more nuanced version of originalism does not, however, avoid the problem of instability. Without stare decisis,
there will be no stability at the “meta” level: in determining
which constitutional provisions are vague or the extent of their
vagueness, in locating ambiguity, or in deciding whether one
interpretation implements original meaning more faithfully
than another. Different judges applying the same basic approach to interpretation will reach different conclusions about
when meaning is vague or ambiguous and about the extent of
the permissible leeway in interpretation. These differences will
produce interesting theoretical debates on the bench but little
in the way of reliable law.
This proposal essentially amounts to giving the Supreme
Court the scope of authority in interpreting the Constitution
similar to what the Chevron doctrine gives agencies in interpreting statutes.74 Under Chevron, roughly speaking, a court
will uphold an agency interpretation of the statute if it is a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision.75
Yet the Chevron doctrine would rest on slippery foundations if
every application of the doctrine by the courts were subject to
de novo reconsideration. Questions of how to apply Chevron in
particular settings are often difficult and divisive, and the same
would be true for the proposed scheme. The statute that looks
unambiguous to one judge is utterly opaque to another. Similarly, judges will predictably differ in their views about the
analogous issues in constitutional interpretation, producing
wobbling legal interpretations. For the scheme to provide legal
stability, it needs to be backed with second-level stare decisis,
in the same way that judicial decisions applying the Chevron
74. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984) (“Considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . .”). For some complications regarding the scope of the doctrine, see
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding that Chevron applies only when agency action has the force of law and that other agency
actions may receive some lesser degree of deference).
75. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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doctrine must be binding precedents. Otherwise, the borderline
cases would remain forever unsettled, with no one quite sure
whether an interpretation that was acceptable yesterday would
remain there tomorrow, or instead would be found to be in tension with the text.
The dependency of formalism on stare decisis surfaces
most strikingly in Justice Scalia’s writings. Justice Scalia has
been, on the whole, no fan of stare decisis. Yet he also believes
in the primacy of rules in judicial decisions:
[W]hen in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general rule,
and say, “This is the basis of our decision,” I not only constrain lower
courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next case should have such
different facts that my political or policy preferences regarding the
outcome are quite the opposite, I will be unable to indulge those preferences; I have committed myself to the governing principle. . . . Only
by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in.76

Of course, an individual judge might always feel some reluctance to stray from his own prior pronouncements, but note
that Justice Scalia is speaking here only of the cases in which
he writes for the majority. Thus, he is bound by the previous
decision not only by personal embarrassment over changing his
mind, but because the Court’s pronouncements are binding
rules of law. Otherwise, it would not matter whether he was
“writing for the majority of the Court” or dissenting alone. Indeed, the whole point of the article in which he wrote those
words was that law ought, whenever possible, to consist of
binding rules.
Yet, without stare decisis, the Court’s pronouncements—
even when grounded in a vision of original meaning—could not
possibly constitute a rule binding on the Justices in the future,
but would only be, at most, a revocable command to the lower
courts. Lower court judges themselves would hardly be motivated to follow these temporary promulgations to the letter,
knowing that whether their decisions were affirmed or reversed
would depend instead on a de novo investigation by the Supreme Court of each new case as it arose.
Thus, even if we could somehow miraculously rewind the
clock and ensure that every Justice in history practiced the
most currently trendy form of originalism, we would still find
that we needed stare decisis—if not for legal issues, then at
least for the specific tenets of originalist methodology and their
application in critical disputes cases.
76. Scalia, supra note 27, at 1179–80.
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III. PRECEDENT AND LEGITIMACY:
THE CASE OF ABORTION
Discussing stare decisis today without mentioning Casey77
is like presenting Hamlet without Hamlet—or, some might say,
Harry Potter without the evil Voldemort. Casey is by far the
most notable and controversial application of the doctrine in recent years. In part, this is because the Court’s willingness to
stand by precedent came as such a surprise. After all, in words
of one sage observer, “The last thing one would have expected
the Rehnquist Court to do was to reaffirm Roe v. Wade.”78
Casey is notable because of its very self-conscious application of stare decisis. In particular, the Casey opinion by Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter79 placed considerable stress on
the notion that part of Roe was entitled to special precedential
force.80 To understand Casey, it is important to keep in mind
that this enhanced version of stare decisis was applied only to
one part of Roe. This was the “central holding” that “viability
marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal
life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on
nontherapeutic abortions.”81 According to Casey, the only debatable aspect of that holding was the “strength of the state interest in fetal protection,” not “the recognition afforded by the
Constitution to the woman’s liberty.”82 Thus, the Casey Court
77. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (declining to overrule the “central holding” of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64
(1973)).
78. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Pressure of Precedent: A Critique of the Conservative Approaches to Stare Decisis in Abortion Cases, 10 CONST. COMMENT.
67, 67 (1993). For other discussions of stare decisis and the abortion issue, see
William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare
Decisis: Casey, Dickerson, and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication,
2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 81–89; Dawn Johnsen, Abortion: A Mixed and Unsettled Legacy, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 301, 303 (Craig Bradley ed., 2006). On
Rehnquist’s own view of stare decisis, see Earl M. Maltz, No Rules in a Knife
Fight: Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 25 RUTGERS
L.J. 669 (1994).
79. This portion of their joint opinion represented a majority of the Court.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
80. Id. at 869. On the “normal” factors to be considered in determining
whether to overrule a case, see Philip P. Frickey, A Further Comment on Stare
Decisis and the Overruling of National League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMMENT.
341, 342–45 (1985); Philip P. Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases:
Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 123 (1985).
Those factors are discussed in the Casey opinion, 505 U.S. at 854–61.
81. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
82. Id. at 858.
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relied on stare decisis to shore up its finding that the interest
in fetal life is insufficiently compelling to overcome a woman’s
fundamental right.
The Casey opinion emphasized:
[The] Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people
to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices
that the Court is obliged to make.83

Hence, “the Court’s legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled
character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.”84
The Court then explained why, in its view, overruling Roe’s
holding about fetal life would impair judicial legitimacy:
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a
case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision
has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry.
It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in
the Constitution.85

In such circumstances, the Court said, “to overrule under fire in
the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision” would appear simply to be “a surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle
on which the Court staked its authority in the first instance.”86
The main dissent, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, took
quite another view. “Our constitutional watch,” Rehnquist said,
“does not cease merely because we have spoken before on an issue; when it becomes clear that a prior constitutional interpretation is unsound we are obliged to reexamine the question.”87
“[J]ust as the Court should not respond to [public] protest by
retreating from the decision simply to allay the concerns of the
protesters, it should likewise not respond by determining to
adhere to the decision at all costs lest it seem to be retreating
under fire.”88 Justice Scalia was even more forthright: “I cannot
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 865–66.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 866–67.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 955 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 959–60.
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agree with, indeed I am appalled by, the Court’s suggestion
that the decision whether to stand by an erroneous constitutional decision must be strongly influenced—against overruling
no less—by the substantial and continuing public opposition
the decision has generated.”89 Justice Scalia said, “Indeed, the
notion that we would decide a case differently from the way we
otherwise would have in order to show that we can stand firm
against public disapproval is frightening.”90
Even before the Court’s reaffirmation of Roe in Casey,
Henry Monaghan, a leading scholar of conservative bent had
argued that “Roe provides a ready example” of why “departure
from precedent may sometimes threaten the stability and continuity of the political order and should therefore be avoided.”91
More generally, he argued, “[A]dherence to precedent can contribute to the important notion that the law is impersonal in
character, that the Court believes itself to be following a ‘law
which binds [it] as well as the litigants.’”92 For, he said, the
Court’s “institutional position would be weakened were it generally perceived that the Court itself views its own decisions as
little more than ‘a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day
and train only.’”93 The question then is whether “judicial selfprotection is a legitimate criterion that should be taken into account in deciding whether to adhere to a challenged precedent,”94 a question Monaghan tentatively answered in the affirmative.95
Under this view, deviation from precedent may cast doubt
on the Court’s integrity, particularly when the precedent has
come under heavy political fire. Indeed, for some Justices, this
may be more than just a question of institutional stature. A
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 998 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Monaghan, supra note 1, at 751.
Id. at 752 (quoting ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 50 (1976)).
93. Id. at 753 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting)).
94. Id. at 762.
95. Id. at 763. Monaghan reached this conclusion partly because he
thought it was almost inevitable that judges would consider this factor, and
partly because political protection for the Court is closely related to the need
to maintain the Court’s legitimacy. Id. Compare this view with Schauer’s assertion that “[i]f internal consistency strengthens external credibility, then
minimizing internal inconsistency by standardizing decisions within a decisionmaking environment may generally strengthen that decisionmaking environment as an institution.” Schauer, supra note 2, at 600.
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plausible suggestion is that in authoring the joint opinion in
Casey, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter were “concerned, perhaps above all else, with public perceptions of their
personal integrity: They wanted to make it clear that their
votes were never precommitted to overruling Roe.”96
Yet, such reference to political factors in applying stare decisis is also troubling. Apart from the empirical question of
whether the Court’s public legitimacy would indeed be threatened by a reversal of course, it is paradoxical to give the most
controversial decisions additional precedential weight. For, the
more questionable a decision and the more contrary to public
opinion, the more the Court would cling to it.
One could argue with at least equal justice that heated
public controversy should lead the Court to reconsider its constitutional position with particular care. Such controversy
demonstrates that the issue is one where the political process
might well reach conclusions at odds with the Court’s, making
more crucial the question of whether to block that process. Furthermore, political controversy may be a sign that the societal
stakes are high, so that an error is especially undesirable. Understandably, individual Justices may be troubled by the perception that they are acting in response to political pressure or
to undisclosed commitments to the Presidents who appointed
them. The proper response, however, is for those Justices to
consider the merits of the case with particular care, to guard
against any unconscious influences from political pressures one
way or the other, and then to explain their reasoning with clarity to the public.97
On the whole, Casey seems to have gone too far in its argument for giving special weight to precedents such as Roe.
This did not mean that stare decisis was irrelevant in Casey.
Despite the Casey Court’s inflated description of stare decisis
as applied to the case before it,98 it is important to note the limited way in which Casey actually applies stare decisis. On perhaps the most fundamental question before it, whether liberty

96. Paulsen, supra note 24, at 1551. Historians will be in a better position
to judge the truth of this assertion, but it does not seem at all implausible that
concerns about personal integrity played a role. No Supreme Court Justice
wants to be seen as a mere toady to the President who made the appointment.
97. Roe does not quite fit the category of bedrock precedents, given its
relatively recent vintage, its limited subject matter, and its continuing rejection by substantial minorities on the Court.
98. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–79 (1992).
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encompasses a woman’s decision to carry or not carry a pregnancy to term, the Court did not rely on stare decisis. The Casey Court’s view was that women’s reproductive autonomy is
constitutionally protected, not simply because previous precedents had said so, but because that was actually the best interpretation of the Constitution.99 If, as Justice Scalia and others
have argued, this aspect of Roe had been based on a completely
unfounded conception of constitutional liberty,100 respect for
the Roe opinion should not have been enough to save it. But the
Court did not agree on the merits of that constitutional issue
with the dissenters, regardless of precedent.101
Rather, the Court applied stare decisis only to the subsidiary holding in Roe that the state’s interest was insufficiently
compelling to justify a complete ban on abortion.102 Here, stare
decisis seems to have a greater rule. Determining the weight of
a government interest inevitably involves an element of judgment. The fact that many Justices over a prolonged period of
time have assessed an interest as noncompelling makes that
judgment more plausible. Perhaps not plausible enough to survive if a Justice was unshakably convinced to the contrary, but
at least plausible enough to be entitled to the benefit of the
doubt. Thus, the way the Casey Court actually deployed stare
decisis was a good deal sounder than some of the rhetoric the
Court used to describe what it was doing.
IV. APPLYING PRECEDENTS
The Casey Court’s treatment of precedent was disputed for
reasons going beyond its refusal to overrule the “central holding” of Roe. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent berated the majority for claiming to be following Roe, while in reality deviating
in critical respects, particularly through a rejection of Roe’s
trimester system.103 Rehnquist wrote:

99. See id. at 846–54.
100. Id. at 979–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 846–53 (majority opinion). Nevertheless, it is significant that
this aspect of Roe was rooted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(striking down a ban on contraceptives), which does seem to have acquired canonical status.
102. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–73.
103. See id. at 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Actually, Roe’s trimester
system had eroded well before Casey. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak,
Beyond the Roe Debate: Judicial Experience with the 1980’s “Reasonableness”
Test, 76 VA. L. REV. 519, 522–23 (1990).
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Stare decisis is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as meaning “to
abide by, or adhere to, decided cases.” Whatever the “central holding”
of Roe that is left after the joint opinion finishes dissecting it is surely
not the result of that principle. While purporting to adhere to precedent, the joint opinion instead revises it. Roe continues to exist, but
only in the way a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality.104

It is one thing to say that a precedent should be followed. It
is another to say precisely what it means to follow precedent.105
This is not an easy question to answer. As a writer of an earlier
generation remarked, “Yet when one asks, how does one determine the legal significance of judicial precedents?—one finds
only fragmentary answers in authoritative materials and no
entirely satisfactory theory offered by the writers who have
dealt with the subject.”106 That seems to remain true today.
In various legal systems, precedent may be used as the basis for an analogy, or seen as exemplifying a general principle,
or as establishing a binding rule.107 Anglo-American law has
also been unclear: “The precedent has been viewed as limited to
the ‘decision’ on the ‘material facts’ as seen by the precedent
court, or the same as seen by the nonprecedent court; for others, the term means the ‘rules’ formulated by the precedent
court; for still others, the term includes the reasons given for
the rules formulated.”108
In rough terms, the dispute over the treatment of precedent can be seen in the familiar distinction between legal rules
and standards.109 This distinction itself is not razor sharp, but
the gist can be seen by comparing “do not exceed 65 m.p.h.” (a
rule) with “do not drive faster than conditions allow” (a standard). Thus, the Wisconsin Interstate’s speed limit is a rule; the
Autobahn follows a standard.

104. Casey, 505 U.S. at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990)).
105. For some reflections on this issue, see Maltz, supra note 2, at 376–83;
Neil MacCormick, The Significance of Precedent, 1988 ACTA JURIDICA 174,
178–87.
106. EDWIN W. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW
300 (1953).
107. See MacCormick, supra note 105, at 181.
108. Monaghan, supra note 1, at 763. The description in PATTERSON, supra
note 106, at 300–20, while several decades earlier, is to the same effect.
109. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (discussing the distinction between rules and standards
and the policies favoring rules versus standards); Sullivan, supra note 60, at
56–69 (same).
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Justice Scalia’s view of precedent calls on courts to lay
down clear-cut dictates whenever possible; those rules are then
binding as rules on later courts until overruled.110 If precedents
are viewed as more fact-bound or as relating to general principles rather than to specific rules, they begin to look much more
like legal standards.111 In contrast to Scalia, the majority in
Casey viewed Roe as creating a standard with flexibility around
its “core,” rather than as an ironclad rule.112
The general outlines of the standards/rules debate are familiar to lawyers and legal scholars. By creating sharp boundaries, rules have the advantage of being easy to apply and highly
predictable. Their application also is supposedly more objective,
in the sense that the varying perspectives of decision makers
are less likely to affect the outcome. Rules are also more readily
applied by lower-level decision makers, an important consideration in cases like Miranda113 where the law must be implemented by low-level officials such as police officers.
But rules also have the defects of their virtues. Creating
sharp, easily applied lines comes at the cost of unfair treatment
of unusual or borderline cases, which might otherwise warrant
individualized treatment.114 Predictability comes at the expense of learning from experience, since new insights can only
be incorporated in the law through the relatively radical step of
changing the entire rule. “Objectivity” in applying rules may
mean that disputes about constitutional values are often disguised as semantic arguments about the meaning of the rule.115
110. SCALIA, supra note 59, at 7–9. The trimester system in Roe is plainly
an effort to establish such a binding rule. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–
65 (1993). As one advocate of the theory of precedent concedes, this theory cannot be reconciled with the conventional legal view that distinguishing a precedent is different from partially overruling it. See Larry Alexander, Precedent,
in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 503, 507 (Dennis
Patterson ed., 1996).
111. For some recent defenses of standards as opposed to rules in constitutional law, see Toni M. Massaro, Constitutional Law as “Normal Science,” 21
CONST. COMMENT. 547, 556 (2004); Suzanna Sherry, Hard Cases Make Good
Judges, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 3, 15 (2004).
112. See Sullivan, supra note 60, at 70–74 (characterizing the dispute over
the use of precedent in Casey in terms of rules and standards).
113. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
114. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Formalism and the Red-Hot Knife, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 597, 601 (1999).
115. There are limits to how far a rule-based approach can go to limit judicial discretion. See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason:
Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 542–43
(1992).
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Surely, constitutional interpretation should not turn on dueling
dictionaries or fine-grained word splitting.
Moreover, in the setting of a judicial body, treating precedents as creating rules rather than principles or analogies increases the demands on the Court as a collective institution.116
The members of a majority must not only be able to agree on
the outcome or on a general principle, but on the precise contours of a rule of law. The foreseeable result of a rule-oriented
approach to precedent is more fractured courts, with fewer majority opinions.
Moreover, treating precedents as rules requires future
judges to defer more completely to their predecessors, a degree
of self-abnegation that may not come easily. Judges must feel a
strong sense of commitment to precedent in order to follow not
only the outcome and principle of an earlier case, but the precise legal test articulated by the court in that case. The temptation to abandon the rule will be correspondingly greater, especially when the follow-on case involves circumstances that were
not contemplated when the rule was established or when a new
judge does not agree with the original decision. This makes
rules more brittle than standards, since they cannot be bent
but only broken and recast. Thus, because a rule is less flexible
than a standard, it is less likely to maintain the allegiance of
later judges.117 Perhaps for this reason, rule-like precedents
have a tendency to evolve into standards. This is exemplified by
the way Casey reworked the rule-oriented Roe opinion, with its
rigid trimester system, into the standard-like undue burden
test.118 Rules have a way of weathering poorly as precedents.
This is a lesson that Justice Scalia has learned, to his evident discomfort. In some important majority opinions, he has
tried to create strong rules, only to discover that other Justices
regarded these precedents merely as standards. For example,
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,119 he attempted to establish
sharp limits on standing,120 only to see the Court move back to
a standard-like approach in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.121 Similarly, he at116. See id. at 538–39.
117. See Sullivan, supra note 60, at 90.
118. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–79 (1992).
119. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
120. Id. at 560–62.
121. 528 U.S. 167, 181–83 (2000). Justice Scalia promoted a more rule-like
approach to takings law in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
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tempted to move takings law away from the standard-based
approach of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,122 only to see that approach triumphant again a few years
later.123 Judicial announcements of rules do not work unless
judges are motivated to stick with them faithfully; otherwise,
they are merely misleadingly emphatic ways of creating standards.
The choice between rules and standards is ultimately a
pragmatic one. In the setting of constitutional doctrine, however, standards often have a strong advantage over rigid rules
simply because it is easier to gain and then maintain majority
support for them. Thus, there is much to be said for treating
constitutional precedents as sources of principles or of fruitful
analogies rather than as entrenching rigid rules of law, except
in unusual cases like Miranda where there is a special need for
sharp boundaries to guide government officials.
It may seem that treating precedents as standards rather
than rules undercuts the very stability that stare decisis was
supposed to provide. But there is a difference between stability
and rigidity. Maximizing stability may call for flexibility, as the
familiar comparison between the storm-resistant qualities of
oaks and willows reminds us.
CONCLUSION
Stare decisis limits the extent to which any vision of constitutional meaning can be incorporated into the law. The body of
existing law is simply too unwieldy to fit any tidy theoretical
scheme, whether based on maximizing social welfare, respecting original meaning, or upholding ethical theories. And yet,
without stare decisis, none of these other sources of constitutional meaning can effectively be transformed into law. If
precedent carried no weight, whatever the Court might say
about constitutional meaning today would be up for grabs tomorrow.
While precedent can help stabilize law, it is a mistake to
expect too much from it. Notwithstanding some of the loose
language of the Casey opinion, no one prior decision can be

1003 (1992), and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987).
122. 438 U.S. 104, 123–27 (1978).
123. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 336–37 (2002).
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completely sacrosanct. Moreover, the effort to make precedents
a source of bright-line rules is often apt to fail. Precedents more
often serve as a source of principles and a basis for analogy,
uses that make them less decisive but more rugged than most
efforts at judicial “rulemaking.” There are limits to how much a
court, especially in a constitutional case, can act like a legislature, laying down clear rules that will govern the future.
Thus, precedent provides incomplete constraint, but real
guidance nonetheless. At the same time, it provides a foundation for an evolving body of doctrine. Consequently, it gives us a
constitutional regime stable enough to support the rule of law,
but flexible enough to adapt to changing constitutional visions.

